The United States military is a profession in the truest sense of the term, particularly in the case of career officers, and is principally comprised of two cohorts in the active force and the retired career military. Because retired military leaders retain their association with the active military and the military profession more generally, they are under an obligation to maintain the same distinctive nonpartisan ethic as the active force with regard to politics, policy, and the public domain in matters directly affecting U.S. military and national security policy. Public criticism of national security policy by retired senior leaders risks unintended consequences detrimental to the military profession, including compromised trust between the military and civilian communities, denigration of the profession's standing with civilian leaders, and the potential for division within the profession itself. It is time for recognition of retired senior leaders as fully vested members of the military profession, who are therefore subject to the same professional ethic of nonpartisanship in matters of national security and the conduct of current military operations. Eisenhower was confronted by active and vociferous opposition from uniformed Army leaders to his strategic approach which relied heavily upon nuclear weapons at the expense of a large standing Army. 3 This opposition endured well into the retirements of General Matthew B. Ridgway, General James M. Gavin, and General Maxwell Taylor, 2 who each wrote and advocated against what they perceived as a poorly conceived policy compromising national security in the face of a rising Soviet threat. 4 In the modern era, policy advocacy by retired military leaders has taken on a new political character that could have hardly been imagined a half century ago. The contemporary nature of instant and enduring information via the Internet and print and cable news has fundamentally altered the manner in which the voices of former senior leaders are received and utilized. Association with the active force affords retired senior leaders important credibility and responsibility in matters affecting the national security dialogue requiring a renewed vigilance and attention.
Stewardship and the Retired Senior Leader: Toward a New Professional Ethic

In the interest of winning this war we all must defer judgments about the efficacy of our wartime leaders to the wisdom of the American voters and
An essential issue is whether, given the partisanship and proliferation of public information, retired military leaders are bound to a professional ethic subjugating their right of public participation to an ethic of political stoicism and restraint. The following discussion attempts to answer this question, looking at the associative nature of the military profession and the juxtaposition of legitimate policy dissent against an apolitical professional ethic.
Perhaps most importantly, it considers whether retired military leaders have a responsibility to the military profession that endures beyond active service. The idea of stewardship of the military profession by its retired cohort is examined in the context of its consequences for the profession of arms, its relationship to the American public, whether retired leaders' enduring association with the armed forces obligates them to an ethical code of nonpartisan restraint congruent with their elevated place within military society, and the nation at large. Service under arms has been seen at some times and in some places as a calling resembling that of a priesthood in its dedication....a more or less exclusive group coherence, a complex of institutions peculiar to itself, and educational pattern adapted to its own specific needs, a career structure of its own and a distinct place in the society which has brought it forth. In all these respects it has strong points of resemblance to medicine and the law, as well as the holy orders. 
Retired Leaders as Stewards of the Profession
As a function of professional responsibility and association, the retired cohort are those senior members of the profession who dedicated the better part of their working life to military service, were educated in its schools and war colleges, steeped in its 17 Swain concluded that the retired cohort of senior leaders is bound to at least the spirit of Marshall's commitment and abstention from partisan involvement.
Swain observed,
It is at least a false proposition that upon retirement officers revert to full civilian status in so far as the obligations they undertook at their commissioning. Retirement is not resignation. It is a matter of fact, not interpretation, that retired officers remain members of the armed forces by law and regulation....Unless, like George Washington, they lay down their commissions by resignation, it is reasonable to assume that they remain at least ethically obliged to observe the limitations imposed by commissioned service, accepted by the oath they made and commission they still hold. These limitations are imposed by obligations of loyalty to the Constitution, the virtues of patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities, and certainly, as officers, include public respect to the office of the President and other Department of Defense civil authorities. Huntington's idea of corporateness, in particular, has a special resonance in describing the active and retired cohorts together under a corresponding professional ethic, and their shared membership within the broader military profession. He describes both "associational" professions (law, medicine) and "bureaucratic" professions (diplomatic corps), 22 and notes they are not mutually exclusive, the first having an express code of conduct, while the later operates under a "collective professional responsibility" toward society. 23 The military profession shares elements of both, and the unique characteristic of what Huntington describes as "a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen. This collective sense has its origins in the lengthy discipline and training necessary for professional competence, the common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility." 24 In much the same way, senior military leaders share a unique responsibility toward the military profession and its interests, place, and role in society. 25 As its most At every stage of his military career, no matter what the personal discomfort, the professional officer must seek to behave correctly. As Epictetus puts it, life is like a play, and 'it is your duty to act well the part that is given you; but to select the part belongs to another.' 37 Stoicism might therefore be useful as a system for informing the conduct of former military leaders in their approach to policy dialogue and dissent. By "playing the Soldier's part" they are satisfying the higher virtue of temperance and wisdom so crucial to service in arms, in deference to the professional ethic of non-partisanship and recognition of its importance to the military, now and for the future.
Just as importantly, a Stoic approach to post-retirement partisanship also serves an ethic of loyalty to the active cohort by mitigating challenges to their credibility to speak out on controversial matters. Echoing Huntington's concern that partisanship could "divide the profession against itself," when retired leaders enter the public domain to criticize civilian or active military authorities, they risk compromising the legitimacy of current leaders whose express duty it is to execute orders that are given. 38 Policy criticism by respected voices within the military profession carry with it a challenge to the profession itself, particularly the active cohort, and as a result their tempered restraint in such matters helps sustain the military's much earned trust among the public at large.
Professional Stewardship and Civil Society
There exists an inescapable ethical component to a career officer's relationship to the military profession in its relationship to civil society. If it is appropriate for military leaders in a democracy to be apolitical during active service, and that such is in the best interest of the nation, then it is reasonable to expect that officers respect the same upon transition to a retired status. There is an ethical trust, and perhaps even a moral virtue, generals. 44 Such high profile involvement, presumably designed to bolster a candidate's national security credentials, creates undue risk to the objective character so integral to the military profession and its relationship to civil society. 45 The Golby, Feaver and Dropp study detailed the potentially adverse consequences resulting from political activity by retired senior leaders on the military profession's standing within civil society.
[The survey suggests that] such endorsements do affect the way the public views the military and that endorsements may undermine trust and confidence in the military over the long term....This perception also might undermine military recruiting efforts and hinder effective civil-military relations. This dissent and the widespread perception that the retired generals 'spoke for' their former colleagues still on active duty threatened the public trust in the military's apolitical and nonpartisan ethic of service as well as the principle of civilian control.
48
Others have similarly observed the detrimental effect on civil-military relations whenever retired senior leaders enter the political domain. In studying the political activity of retired general officers during the mid-1990s, Boston University professor Andrew Bacevich, himself a West Point graduate and career Army officer, concluded that all they accomplished was a regrettable degradation of the profession, and themselves. 49 At its core, the concern arising when retired senior leaders enter public policy debates has its roots in the relationship of the military profession to the civil society, national leadership, and the active military itself. Accurately or not, and fairly or not, retired senior leaders represent something bigger than themselves whenever they enter the public domain and with that comes a certain responsibility. The representation is nearly always implicit, but as Golby, Feaver, and Dropp observe, that is enough. "When veterans of any rank explicitly or implicitly suggest that they are speaking on behalf of the military as an institution, they have crossed the line and are risking considerable damage to the norm of a non-partisan military." A good analogy for this is the U.S. judiciary. There is an unwritten professional code that generally restrains members of the judiciary from public criticism of judicial decisions by others out of a personal and professional commitment to the rule of law. 52 If judicial decisions were commonly prey to popular criticism outside formal appellate processes, citizens and institutions would begin to question the competency and legitimacy of the judiciary as an essential social and political institution. In this way the military is no different. When retired senior officers question the validity of military policy or the civilian leadership they call into question the expertise and competence of the profession itself, and those active members participating in the decision making. 53 As the military develops its senior leaders, the profession must continually affirm its apolitical character if it is to achieve consensus of the ethic's fundamental value, and the alternative's genuine professional risks. A good start to this habituation would be a straight forward approach toward a new professional ethic regarding nonpartisanship by members of the profession's retired cohort.
Toward a New Professional Ethic
The relationship of the military profession to society has long been influenced by a code of ethical conduct that is both formal, as expressed in the Joint Ethics Regulation, and implied through standards of conduct developed over many generations. 54 Huntington described this behavior as "comparable to the canons of a professional ethics of the physician and lawyer….the officer's code expressed in custom, tradition, and the continuing spirit of the profession." Once an officer achieves flag rank, it seems likely that the broader public would view his statements as "official" even if he tried to claim they were his own private, personal views....Consequently, an effective taboo must focus on flag officers at a minimum. interest. 60 These rules are in place because they serve the best interests of the public.
A reasonable set of sanctions for retiring senior leaders is entirely consistent with this.
For example, a formal approach might codify a two-year "cooling off" period following retirement prohibiting any public statement advocating for or against a particular policy, political candidate, or operational matter implicating the Department of Defense or its subordinate military services. Jason Dempsey also suggests consequences for recently retired general officers who "use the military's prestige for partisan purposes." 61 These include removing the title of general from official correspondence, denial of speaking rights before active military audiences, and exclusion from various mentoring programs. 62 He concludes that, at a minimum, "more professional opprobrium should be meted out to those who step in front of national political conventions and have the temerity to claim to be 'simple soldiers.'" 63 Regardless of what form such penalties take, the achievement would be the professional recognition of a new ethic of nonpartisanship incumbent upon retired senior leaders. The normative values for the profession would help define a standard recognizing the important role that retired senior leaders play as stewards and, as Huntington concluded, "remain true to themselves, to serve with silence and courage in the military way." 64 It would also clearly articulate the risks and potential adverse consequences to the profession and the civil-military relationship that come from retired officers who, as Jason Dempsey described, implicitly deal in "a commodity they should realize is not theirs to trade." 65 
22
_________________________________________________________________ Endnotes
